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Summary
This paper investigates the connection between resource abundance and innovation, as a
transmission mechanism that can elucidate part of the resource curse hypothesis; i.e. the
observed negative impact of resource wealth on income growth. We develop a variation
of the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model with endogenous growth to explain the
phenomenon. In this model, consumers trade off leisure versus consumption, and firms
trade off innovation efforts versus manufacturing. For this model, we show that an
increase in resource income frustrates economic growth in two ways: directly by
reducing work effort and indirectly by inducing a smaller proportion of the labor force
to engage in innovation.
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
Recent empirical evidence and theoretical work provides strong support to a resource curse 
hypothesis; i.e. natural resource wealth tends to impede rather than promote economic growth 
(Auty 1994, Sachs and Warner 1995, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, Leite and Weidmann 1999, 
Rodriguez and Sachs 1999, Gylfason 2000, 2001a, 2001b, Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004). The 
expectations of many early development economists (Nurkse 1953, Rostow 1960, Watkins 
1963) that natural capital would be an important pillar to build economic development proved 
at odds with outcomes. Resource riches such as oil reserves, fish banks and fertile land 
became associated with a slowdown in economic growth across the world during the last three 
decades. One of the most striking examples and manifests of the resource curse hypothesis is 
the disappointing performance of the oil cartel countries. Over the last four decades, the 
OPEC countries as a whole experienced a negative rate of GDP per capita growth (Gylfason 
2001b). Venezuela ranked among the ten wealthiest nations at the beginning of 19
th century, 
but despite its vast oil reserves, it is downgraded to the level of a developing country (Jones 
2002). Similarly, Alaska is the only U.S. state with a negative growth rate over the last two 
decades, despite its extensive oil reserves and fishing industry.  
  Several theories have been developed and tested to explain the resource curse paradox. 
The main focal point of these analyses lies in the crowding-out effects of resource wealth, as 
resource wealth decreases the perceived need for growth supporting policies, prudent long-
term planning and efficient management of available resources (Ascher 1999, Auty 2001, 
Gylfason 2001b, Usui 1997). Resource abundance retards economic growth by crowding-out 
its determinants (Sachs and Warner 2001). Resource rich countries tend to suffer from 
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currency appreciations and loss of competitivess (Corden 1984), inefficient allocations of 
resources (Corden and Neary 1982, Robinson and Torvik 2004), enhanced corruption and 
rent-seeking (Baland and Francois 2000, Krueger 1974, Torvik 2002), bad-decision making 
(Sachs and Warner 1999b, Auty 2001), increased public spending (Ross 2001) and political 
instability (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, Olsson 2003). 
  The scope of this paper is on a crowding out effect of resource abundance mostly 
neglected in the literature: the crowding out of innovation or entrepreneurship. Sachs and 
Warner (2001) point out that wage premia in the resource sector may encourage innovators to 
engage in the primary rather than the R&D sector, but they do not further develop this idea. 
Since ultimately, technological progress and the discovery of new ideas and inventions drive 
growth, the effect of natural resources on R&D deserves particular attention. We develop a 
variation of the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model with endogenous growth, where individuals 
trade off consumption and leisure in terms of utility. We show that an increase of the resource 
base in the economy induces a reduction in the steady-state labor supply. Resource rents allow 
individuals to reduce their work effort (and related disutility) and use the resource revenues to 
pay for extra consumption. We show that the subsequent decline in labor intensity has two 
successive implications for economic growth. First, resource abundance reduces the total 
hours worked and total output. Secondly, resource abundance affects growth indirectly by 
inducing a smaller proportion of the labor force to engage in innovation.  
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides empirical evidence to the negative 
correlation between resource-abundance and different measures of innovation. Section 3 is 
devoted to a formal description of the endogenous growth Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model, 
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while section 4 derives the dynamic equilibrium and main propositions linking resource 
abundance to poor economic performance. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  E MPIRICAL EVIDENCE: RESOURCE-ABUNDANCE AND INNOVATION 
Figures 1 to 4 show scatter plots that illustrate the correlation between different measures of 
innovation and natural wealth. Data on R&D expenditures are provided by the United Nations 
(2002). Natural wealth is defined as the share of natural capital in the total capital stock, 
calculated by the World Bank (1997). The estimated regression line and adjusted R
2 is quoted 
at the right-top corner of each scatter plot. Although earlier observations on natural capital 
would be preferable in order to avoid endogeneity of the independent variable, 1994 is the 
only year for which data on natural capital are available. Gylfason (2001) argues that the share 
of natural capital is still a good proxy for resource-abundance, since it is rather stable over 
time. Indeed, the results in all figures can be reproduced by using alternative measures of 
resource abundance, such as the Sachs and Warner (1995) measure of the share of primary 
exports in GDP in 1971 or the share of agricultural production in GDP for the same year. 
  Figure 1 shows a cross-country scatter plot of 42 observations (single countries) relating 
R&D expenditure as a share of GDP between 1990-2000 and the World Bank measure of 
natural wealth. The negative relationship between the two variables is significant at the 1% 
level. As can be seen, there is not a single country with a natural capital share above 10% 
having a share of R&D expenditures above the 2% level. 
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Figure 1. Resource-Abundance and R&D Expenditure (Cross-country Sample)  
  
  Figure 2 demonstrates a similar pattern between resource abundance and innovation for a 
sample of 52 countries. As a measure of innovation, we now consider the numbers of 
researchers and engineers employed in the R&D sector. Data on R&D employees are 
provided by the United Nations (2002). The scatter plot indicates a highly significant 
correlation between natural resources and employees in the R&D sector. The Central African 
Republic and Guinea-Bissau have a share of natural capital around 30 and 40%, respectively, 
and can be seen at the bottom-right side of the scatter plot having almost no researchers and 
engineers employed in the R&D sector. 
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Figure 2. Resource-Abundance and R&D Employees 
 
   Figure 3 focuses on the number of patents granted in 1998 as a proxy for innovation. 
Whereas Figures 1 and 2 measured innovation based on available data on the inputs needed in 
the R&D sector, Figure 3, instead, examines a proxy for the output of R&D. Data on patents 
are provided by the United Nations (2002). The scatter plot reveals again a negative statistical 
relationship between innovation measured as patents and resource abundance for a sample of 
31 countries. The two countries with the highest number of patents granted were the resource 
scarce countries Japan and South Korea.  
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Figure 3. Resource-Abundance and Patents 
 
  Finally, we turn from a cross-country to a cross-state comparison within the US. As a 
measure of resource abundance we use the share of the primary sector’s production in Gross 
State Product (GSP), which is the state equivalent to GDP. As a proxy for innovation we use 
the share of R&D expenditures in GSP. Data on natural resources and R&D are compiled 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2003) of the U.S. Ministry of Commerce and the 
Industry, Research and Development System (IRIS) of the National Science Foundation 
(2003), respectively. Figure 4 shows that the negative correlation between resource abundance 
and innovation carries over to the state level. We notice that Alaska and Wyoming have the 
most extensive primary sectors in the U.S. and the lowest amount of funds allocated to 
research. 
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Figure 4. Resource-Abundance and R&D Expenditure (Cross-state Sample for the U.S.) 
 
  The figures above demonstrate a tendency of resource-abundant countries and states to 
innovate less. We should, though, keep in mind that it is likely that our data underestimate the 
magnitude of the negative correlation between natural resources and innovation. Most 
resource abundant countries are relatively poor and do not provide data for any R&D 
activities. Therefore, many resource abundant countries are excluded from the samples. 
Secondly, not all ideas are patented. To the extent that some ideas are not patented or not 
produced in the R&D sector, some innovation is not captured by our dataset. Furthermore, the 
people engaged in R&D are not equally productive and talented nor are all patents of the same 
value. Therefore, our data measure innovation in a rather quantitative than qualitative manner.  
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3. MODEL SET UP 
3.1. Consumers 
In this section we analyze a Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans type of model, where infinitely-living 
households choose over time both the level of consumption and the share of time devoted to 
leisure in order to maximize their intertemporal utility. We also incorporate in our analysis an 
endogenous growth channel, where returns to technology investments (which can alternatively 
be conceived as knowledge or labor quality) depend positively on the level of labor input in 
the economy. The intuition is straightforward. Innovation and education become more 
productive when work effort increases. In other words, the harder we work, the more efficient, 
innovative and knowledgeable we become. 
  We assume that the economy consists of identical infinitely-lived agents. Population N(t) 
remains constant at each point in time. Thus, 
N(t) =N .  (1) 
For the type of model we employ, a stable population level is a convenient assumption that 
precludes an ever-increasing growth rate for income per capita and allows the economy to 
converge to a balanced growth path. 
 Individuals  divide  their  available time between work and leisure. A proportion l(t) of their 
time is devoted to work and the rest to leisure activities. Therefore, the level of labor input 
L(t) in the economy is determined respectively by: 
L(t) = l(t)N.  (2) 
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  Each representative household maximizes the following inter-temporal utility function: 
    Uu  ,  (3) 
0
[() ,() ]




where c(t)=C(t)/N denotes consumption per person at time t, C(t) stands for total consumption, 
ρ  is the rate of time preference and it is assumed to be time-invariant and positive, implying 
that agents value future utility less comparatively to current utility. Thus, U(t) is a weighted 
sum of all future discounted utility flows u[c(t),l(t)], where u[c(t),l(t)] represents the 
instantaneous utility function (also referred to as felicity function) of each agent at a given 
date.  
  We assume that the instantaneous utility function u[c(t),l(t)] is separable with respect to 
its two arguments and depends positively on the consumption level c(t) and negatively on the 
work intensity l(t). In other words, we assume that there is a disutility of working effort and 
agents obtain satisfaction from leisure activities. For convenience, we assume a logarithmic 
consumption utility function and a labor disutility function with constant elasticity σ. Also, we 
omit any time references for the rest of the analysis, unless there is need for clarification. 
u(c,l) = lnc – l
1+σ. (4) 
  Each household faces the following budget constraint when maximizing utility: 
Q
vw l r vc
N
=++ − & ,   (5) 
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where v=V/N stands for total value of assets hold per person, the dot denotes the derivative 
over time, wl and Q/N stand for wage and resource income per person, and r for the real 
interest rate obtained per unit of asset value. Each household, thus, maximizes utility subject 
to the budget constraint of equation (5). Therefore, we set up the following Hamiltonian: 
 
1
0 (ln ) [ ]
t Q
Hc l e w l r v
N
σρµ
∞ +− =− + + + − ∫ c . (6) 
The first order conditions with respect to the control variables c and l and the dual variable µ lead 
to the Ramsey Rule (7) and equation (8), which describe the evolution of consumption over time 








σ/c = w  (8) 
3.2. Producers 
It is assumed that there are four sectors in our economy.  First, there is a manufacturing sector 
with constant returns to scale with respect to its inputs labor and intermediates. The price of 
the final good produced in the manufacturing sector is normalized to unity. Following Romer 
(1990), we adopt the conventional specification of a continuum of intermediate capital goods, 
indexed by i∈[0,A]. Each intermediate capital good i represents a distinctive design, and the 
amount of designs A measures the total stock of knowledge. All designs are imperfect 
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substitutes, the level of substitution captured by a parameter 0<α<1. Together, this leads to 






α ∫ ,  (9) 
where 0<γ<1 is the share of laborers working in the manufacturing sector, and xi is the input 
of capital of type i. 
  Firms in the manufacturing sector produce competitively and choose the level of labor 
and intermediate capital goods that maximize their profits: 
1
00 , max( )
i
A





i i , (10) 
where w and pi denote the labor wage (in the manufacturing sector) and the price of durable 
good i, respectively. The first order conditions imply that each firm in the manufacturing 






α ∫ = 








α–1  (12) 
The first order conditions, given by equations (11) and (12), illustrate that firms pay labor and 
capital the value of their marginal products. 
  Secondly, there is a capital goods sector, where all capital intermediates are produced. 
Every durable good xi is produced by a distinct firm using a distinct patent (idea). This implies 
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that all manufacturers of intermediate goods can exert monopolistic power, since their goods 
are imperfect substitutes, whose characteristics are determined by a specific design. Patent 
and copyright laws are allowing the specific firm that purchases and owns the design to use 
exclusively the corresponding idea and produce the related intermediate good. After incurring 
the fixed cost of innovation or the design purchase, each firm in the intermediate sector 
produces each durable good proportional to its capital input. In this way, intermediates can 
also be understood as durables, implying that
0
A
i Kx = d i ∫ , where K is a measure of the total 
capital stock. 
  Firms producing in the intermediate-goods sector buy the ownership for a design at price 
PA, and after incurring the fixed cost of the design purchase, maximize profits π: 
max ( )
i
i iii i x p xx r x π =− , (13) 
where pi(xi) is the demand function for each durable good from the side of the manufacturing 
sector firms, as shown in equation (12). Therefore, pi(xi)xi equals the revenues of each firm 
operating in the intermediate-goods sector. The second part of the maximization represents the 
interest cost firms face when producing each durable good xi. As stated above, each firm in 
the intermediate sector transforms one unit of raw capital into one unit of intermediate good.
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and after taking account of the demand function for durables (12), we can see that the 
monopoly price of each durable good is a mark up over marginal cost that is equal for every 
design: 
 pi  = p = r/α (14) 
  As equation (14) reveals, all intermediate capital goods sell at the same price. Since the 
demand function (12) refers to each individual intermediate good produced, equation (14) 
implies that each durable good is purchased and employed by the manufacturing sector by the 
same amount x. Therefore, we have: 
0
A
i Kx d i A == ∫ x  (15) 
The profits make the ownership of a design a valuable asset with price PA, and, as such, they 
constitute a return to this asset value: 
rPA = π + P
·
A .  (16) 
On a balanced growth path, the equation simplifies to rPA = π. 
  Third, we assume an R&D sector where designs for new intermediate goods are produced 
as in Romer (1990). This sector adds to the knowledge base. It employs a fraction 1–γ of the 
labor input, which is the remainder of the labor force not employed in the manufacturing 
sector. The production function of knowledge has constant returns to scale with respect to 
labor. This specification abstracts from duplication of effort; nor is there a positive spillover 
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between researchers in the R&D sector. Furthermore, the production of designs depends 
positively on the stock of knowledge already discovered, on a one-to-one base. This implies 
that the growth rate of innovation (the rate of design accumulation) is independent of the level 
of knowledge. The stock of knowledge is freely available to all researchers in the R&D sector 
as a public good, and this fosters innovation. Thus, designs evolve according to: 
(1 γ) AA L
•
=−. (17) 
  Knowledge is produced in the innovation sector, where labor earns its marginal value. 
Every design invented is sold to a firm in the intermediate-goods sector for a price PA. 
Marginal productivity of labor in the innovation sector thus becomes: 
w = APA.   (18) 
  Last, we assume there is a resource sector exploiting the natural resource endowments of 
the economy (e.g. oil reserves, mines, fishing banks, timber etc.). The production of the 
resource sector Q depends on the resource endowment available G  (for instance the oil 
reserves discovered or the stock of fish) and the stock of physical capital K. The first 
component is obvious. The larger the resource base available, the larger is the potential to 
process and exploit the resource endowment. Resource booms make a larger amount of 
natural resources available for the resource sector to be exploited. The second component 
assumes that as a side effect of capital accumulation, natural resources are exploited more 
effectively. We take the simple proportional production function, 
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Q(K, G) = GK. (19) 
3.3. Closure 
The production function for the manufacturing sector, after taking account of the capital-





α  (20) 
Equation (20) reveals that production in manufacturing resembles the neoclassical Solow 
model.  The commodity flows are closed by setting total output, or income, Y, from the 





α + KG = C + K
·
 .  (21) 
4. ANALYSIS 
4.1. Dynamic Equilibrium 
In this sub-section, we determine the equations that govern the dynamics for consumption, the 
capital stock, labor supply and the share of labor involved in innovation. 
  First, we determine the share of labor employed in the manufacturing sector versus the 
innovations sector. We compare wages for labor employed in the innovation sector and 
manufacturing sector, and the rate of returns to the two assets, knowledge A and capital K. 
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Labor arbitrage between the manufacturing and innovation sector ensures equal wages. Thus 









=  (22) 
  Next, we determine the level of the interest rate r for capital K. From the demand function 
(14), we know that the interest rate is the product of the parameter α and the durables price p. 
After substituting for the price p from (12), the amount of each durable demanded and 
produced x from (15) and taking account of the production function in the manufacturing 
sector (9), we know that the level of interest rate r is proportional to the ratio of the 




α = .  (23) 
We then proceed to calculate the interest earned on knowledge.  
  The immediate profits of each firm in the intermediate-goods sector can be calculated by 
incorporating equations (12), (14) and (15) into (13): 






αα ππ α α γ α α
− == − = −  (24) 
Taking account of equations (24) and (16) determining the price of patents PA and the level of 
monopolistic profits π, in balanced growth, equation (22) becomes: 
r = αγL. (25) 
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After incorporating equation (23) into (25), we can express the share of the labor input 





γ ==    (26) 
For the analysis of dynamics, it is useful to write equations in intensive forms. From equation 
(21), we can derive the intensive form of total income in the economy by dividing the left-
hand-side by labor in effective terms AL : 






,   (27) 
where lower letter variables with hats denote variables expressed relative to effective labor 
supply, y ^=K/AL, k ^=K/AL, c ^=C/AL. 
  Substituting for the output in the manufacturing sector from equation (20) into (23) allows 






− = ,  (28) 








∧  = 

.  (29) 
  We rewrite equation (7) in its intensive form, and substitute (17) and (28): 
















  (30) 
Subsequently, we rewrite equation (21) in its intensive form substituting (27):  
1










∧∧ =+ − − − − N
α
.  (31) 
These two equations show that consumption and capital dynamics depend on labor supply 
dynamics. To solve for l
·
/l, we first express the level of labor wage in terms of capital per 




1–α.  (32) 





1-α ,   (33) 
 which can be expressed in terms of effective labor as: 
α
1 σ (1 σ)( 1 α) lc k γ
∧∧
+ += −
− . (34) 
Together, we have four equations that determine the dynamics for c ^ (30), k ^ (31), and the levels 
of γ (29) and l (34). For use in the steady state analysis, we also derive equations that describe the 
labor supply l and use γ dynamics. Equation (34) implies that l evolves according to:  












  (35) 











  (36) 














  (37) 
4.2. Steady State 
Along a balanced growth path, capital K, consumption C, output Y and technology A grow at 
the same rate, which implies that the levels of  ,  and   remain constant along the path. It 
can be seen from equations (36) and (37) that the working intensity l and the labor input share 
γ remain constant as well. Therefore, along the balanced growth path equations (30) and (31) 
become: 
ˆ k ˆ c ˆ y
1
1






−−− =  (38) 
1
1 γ (1 ) 0
SS
SS









∧ +− −− = ,  (39) 
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where the subscript SS denotes the steady-state value of each variable along the balanced growth 
path. 
 Equations  (29)  and  (34) evaluated at the steady-state, give the following levels for labor 
supply l and the share of laborers employed in innovation, 





+− += −,  (40) 








α α α αα
γ
−−
∧∧ −   ==  
 
.  (41) 
Along with equations (38) and (39), these two equations constitute a system of four equations 




,  lss and γss. Substitution of these four 











s l ρ α




−   (42) 
The right-hand-side of equation (42) is strictly decreasing in labor supply, lss, so that there is 















=− − −  ++ 
< 0  (43) 
This shows that an increase in resource abundance as captured by G results in a decrease of 
labor intensity at the steady state. Individuals trade off consumption and leisure in terms of 
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utility. An increased amount of resource wealth gives them the opportunity to enjoy the same 
level of utility for a reduced labor effort. In other words, resource abundance increases leisure 
and reduces man-made output. We state this finding as the first proposition: 
 
PROPOSITION 1. The steady state level of labor supply lss is decreasing in the resource base G. 
 
  The rate of knowledge accumulation at the steady-state is given by equation (17). We 
label the steady state rate of knowledge accumulation by  ,  ) / ( ss ss ss A A & = χ
χss = (1–γss)lssN  (44) 
From equations (41) and (51), in the appendix, we derive the ratio of the labor force engaged 















Equation (45) implies that a decrease in labor intensity at the steady-state due to an increase in 
resource endowments, as indicated by equation (43), decreases the ratio of the labor force 
engaged in the R&D sector. Therefore, the accumulation of knowledge decreases for two 
reasons. First, the reduction in labor intensity directly retards knowledge accumulation. 
Secondly, the decrease in labor intensity reduces the rate of knowledge accumulation 
indirectly by lowering the percentage of the labor force engaged in the R&D sector. From 
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equation (44), we can see that technological progress depends negatively on the level of 
resource endowments (both directly and indirectly): 










=− +  + 
s l
< 0,  (46) 
where the derivative 
ss dl
dG
 is negative from equation (43).  
  Therefore, a resource-abundant country with a large natural resource base G will 
experience a lower labor intensity lss  at the steady state and a lower rate of knowledge 
accumulation χss. The economy will grow at a slower pace. This is our major finding: 
 
PROPOSITION 2. Steady state economic growth χss  is decreasing in the resource base G. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
During the past decades, economists tried to explain why resource abundant countries embark 
on a development path that leads to stagnation and economic decline rather than affluence and 
prosperity. Resource wealth did not prove to be the panacea to underdevelopment. On the 
contrary, resource dependence exacerbated poverty and retarded economic growth over the 
past three decades. With a few exceptions, such as those of Botswana, Norway and Iceland, 
resource-abundant countries tend to belong to the list of development failures.  
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  Several indirect mechanisms through which natural resources frustrate income growth 
have been identified in the literature. Resource wealth can deteriorate the terms of trade, 
reduce human capital accumulation, increase corruption and rent-seeking, increase public 
spending and result in political instability. In this paper, we investigate a transmission channel 
not extensively discussed in the literature: the relationship between resource abundance and 
innovation. Innovation is undoubtedly one of the main determinants of economic growth, by 
enhancing the productivity of labor and capital. The pursue of innovators for new ideas and 
designs is motivated by their interest in profiting from them. In our model, natural resources 
reduce the incentives of innovators to engage in R&D. This happens for two reasons. First, the 
discovery of resource reserves reduces the need to support consumption through labor income 
and therefore increases leisure and reduces work effort. Secondly, resource wealth negatively 
affects the allocation of entrepreneurial activity between the manufacturing and the R&D 
sector in favor of the former. 
  Extensions of the analysis should take into account the possibility that work effort may 
also be allocated in the primary sector, as suggested by Sachs and Warner (2001). In this case, 
the share of the labor force employed as researchers in the R&D sector will be directly 
affected by the amount of resource rents, rather than indirectly (through labor intensity) as 
happens in our model. Furthermore, a more extensive database should identify the correlation 
between resource abundance and innovation for a more extensive sample of countries and 
potentially disentangle the effect of natural resources into its components. It is possible that 
specific categories of natural resources, such as minerals and ores have stronger (or weaker) 
crowding-out effect on innovation than others. 
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APPENDIX 
Incorporating equation (41) into equations (38), (39) and (40) yields: 
1 1 1
(1 ) 0 ss ss ss lk N l N
N
α α
α α α α
αρ
− − ∧  +− −= 








lk G l N
N k
α α α
α α α α
α
− ∧ − − ∧
∧
 + +− − = 












.  (49) 
Incorporating equation (49) into (48) yields: 




ss ss ss ss lk G ll N
NN
α α α
α α α αα α
α
σ
− − − − ∧ −   + +− − =   +  
.  (50) 
Rearranging equation (47) yields: 
1 1 1





α α α α
ρα
− − − ∧
−  =+ + 

. (51) 
Incorporating equation (51) into (50) solves for the steady-state value of labor intensity in 
equation (42). 
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